A Brief History Of Islamic Militancy In Pakistan, Systemic And Social Conservatism And A Way Forward

Based on the book pakistan under seige: extremism, Society, and the state by madiha afzal

A few months ago as I was headed to the library, the country was still diving head-wards into a political and consitutional crisis. The No-Confidence motion had been already tabled, and Imran Khan, after losing his party MNAs to the opposition, had initiated his Long March against his opposing alliance PDM and it's appointed leader Shehbaz Shariff.

After days of keeping up with the news, I was frustrated. Just FYI, I am a so-called Neutral. I'm neither Go-Imran nor Go-PDM. For me - a radical feminist and liberal- both are privileged men who have for years benefitted from and have helped worsen the sexist, radicalized, and corrupt institution and society.

And that day, I was looking for anything but political and non-fiction. But someone had misplaced a thin black-and-white book with a red spine that read Pakistan Under Seige.

That was the first time I encountered this book and after being intrigued by its title and what it promised to give, I ended up finishing the book in a maximum of four sitting (I mean it's a non-fiction book after all).

After reading it I was in a self-induced coma of thoughts. I mean I was already a secularist unlike my family or most of my friends, so I resonated with almost all of what was said in this book. So I might have trouble imagining what it might feel like to read about sensitive issues that have plagued our society- and triggers extreme emotions in some people - with such objectivity (which they might not be used to while discussing them).

And unlike most non-fiction books, Madiha Afzal did a tremendous job of sticking with hardcore facts and statistics, that helped me form more informed opinions.

Pakistan Under Siege is a thoroughly researched history of extremism, Legal and Social Islamisation in Pakistan since its inception.

This book sets out to understand the complex relationship of the Pakistani state with Islamisation and Islamist militancy from the beginning through rigorous and careful examination of past records, history, and perspectives of the ordinary Pakistani. In doing so it also helps determine ways in which the sensitive situation -involving religious sentiments ‘of a complex, richly textured country of 200 million people ' - can be improved or stopped from escalating.

It achieves the above aim by first introducing the reader to whether the ordinary Pakistani justifies violence in the name of Islam or not. According to PEW data, an increasing number of Pakistanis resent violence in the name of Islam and Militant groups like TTP (Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan), as is also evident by the current August 2022 Anti-Taliban protests in Waziristan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

It digs deeper into the narratives of those do believe a Muslim must protect his or her religion against his or her enemies -commonly perceived to be the United States, India, and the West. These views have subscribed to conspiracy theories and a state-fed narrative of ‘Islam vs The West’ which makes them suffer from 'a National sense of victimhood’. The author investigates the state's response to extremist groups or rather their ‘explanations for terror’. She further considers what made the Pakistani citizens so sure of their country being an idealist Islamic state despite Quaid's vision of it as a secular one .

It traces the ultimate history of Islamisation since Islam was used in the Pakistan movement pre-partition by Muslim League officials including Jinnah to justify the idea of Pakistan even though he didn’t necessarily intend religion to play a part in politics or business of the state (as also expressed in his address to the constituent assembly in 1947 ). His idea of Pakistan was one where society was based on ‘Islamic ethical and social concerns’ rather than ‘strict Islamic law’.

It was then by the early rulers of the state (notable example: Liaquat Ali Khan) -who were themselves immigrants or muhajir and didn’t connect with their constituents- who decided to declare Islam a unifying factor among all Pakistanis.

In fact, if you go back to the 1940 Lahore Resolution, it was actually presented by Fazl Ul Haq, The Prime Minister of Bengal, who announced that the constituents of future Pakistan shall be divided into ‘independent states’ (as in PLURAL) that shall be 'sovereign' and 'autonomous' that will be bound together by an Army to protect its borders and a shared foriegn policy.

But unfortunately, after partition, Bengalis (who had previously been happy to have a separate state) found themselves under the fold of a single state, being administered by government in Karachi.

*From the objective resolution to Zia’s extremist blasphemy laws and their long-lasting impacts, this book covers what is called the complete history of legal Islamisation in the country’s constitution and penal code.

Initially, I had anticipated that this book will be another anti-state publication, but I was wrong. This book merely proves the state to be incapable of handling insurgencies while politicians fail to realize that by yielding more power electorally they have a greater advantage than Islamists under whom's the pressure they easily succumb to. If you take a close look at history, you'd find the efforts of a few secular idealists like Ayub Khan (although Ayub Khan was the first politician to reduce Pakistan from its diversity to whatever ideology the state propogated) and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto who despite introducing (or intending to introduce) modernist reforms had to give in to religious opposition.

For example when Ayub Khan removed the 'Islamic Republic' to just 'Pakistan' but vetoed his decision when faced with Islamist Opposition. Or when Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto introduced the idea of madrassa education being the equivalent of a master's degree to co-opt the rightists.

To my pleasure, the book tracked down the military’s contribution to the states ‘master narrative’ of ‘Islam vs The West’ and jihadist ideology which was mainstreamed during Zia's regime. It is interesting to note that it was especially during Zia’s time that the line between the state's master narrative and ‘radicalism’ was truly blurred.

The Afghan Jihad or commonly known as the Afghan Miracle was the originating point of the jihadist ideology and the notion that Pakistan was created for Islam (as was popularised by the regime) to increase the number of fighters - or mujahideen- dispatched. And then only the largest number of madrassas were established in order to train those fighters. As is discussed in the book, ‘these fighters were equipped with ideology as much as they were equipped with weapons’.

*The author doesn’t miss out on the civilian-military balance in Pakistan, which is openly dominated by the military. She points out the reason for this might be ‘the Indian threat, which is, thus, in the military’s interest to perpetuate indefinitely.

In relation to Zia's blasphemy or anti-Ahmadi laws, it is interesting to note how questioning these laws was translated to acts of blasphemy itself with examples of Salman Taseer- former governor of Punjab who spoke out against the laws and in support of Asia Bibi (a Christian accused of blasphemy) - who was shot twenty-seven times by his own security personel Mumtaz Qadri. Qadri stated that speaking out against such laws made him an apostate and that Taseer was wajib ul qatl (or worthy of being killed). Qadri was supported by millions of Pakistanis- including classes such that of lawyers who protested his arrest and death penalty like none other. These demonstrations delayed Qadri's death sentence by five years.

And before I say anything about discriminating against minorities' right to freedom of expression, it is important to inform that according to statistics, most Pakistanis feel that minorities are granted full rights and that they face no discrimination whatsoever.

If the majority of the public supports these laws then they should be implemented. But minorities must also be protected by reversing the enforcement of these laws or enforcing them the other way too, that is if a Muslim speaks ill regarding other religions, they should be subject to the same scrutiny and punishment.

But how did the people of Pakistan get swept up by the state's narrative in the first place? Other than press statements issued from time to time, another medium used by the government is the education curriculum.

In 1981, General Zia Ul Haq made Pakistan studies a compulsory subject for all students who wish to get a degree. It was ‘to demonstrate the basis of Pakistan is not founded in racial, linguistic, or geographical factors, but, rather in the shared experience of a common religion.

The objective of Zia using Pakistan studies textbooks for matriculation exams was that ‘defining Pakistan’s identity solely in the form of Islam excludes non-Muslims from that identity.

This book lays the ground that the sole purpose of the curriculum is to justify the creation of Pakistan by suggesting the two-nation theory and partition were utterly unavoidable given how Muslims were always targeted by non-Muslims. Even the language used for non-Muslims in history textbooks conveys the message quite starkly as is investigated by the author.

The author studies the evolution of Pakistan’s educational curriculum from the shift from the federal education ministry-which was completely absolved- after the passing of the 18th amendment (provincial autonomy) to the analysis of the distinction of content in the textbooks and the development of analytical skills in both the matriculation and Cambridge syllabus.

Regarding government schooling, this is an excerpt from the book:
‘There is no critical thinking, or plain thinking, to speak of in these classrooms. This is the typical teaching style across courses in the government curriculum, and it is partly because these teachers are required to teach for the matric exam. This style of learning stems from a hierarchal structure of society, which means information is consumed without question by those in positions of authority- in this case, teachers. This, as we will see plays a role in how these students think’.

Even though General Pervez Musharaf set a culmination reform process in motion in 2004 to be culminated in the revised national curriculum of 2006. New textbooks were written and as per the authors analysis of these textbooks, the effect of the reform was only marginal as distortions, and biases found in the old books remained in the new ones.

The themes of ‘distrust of the West’ and ‘paranoia of India’ were consistent and reoccurring in these textbooks. And what is more is that students don’t question what they read in these textbooks, and with the inability to critically evaluate information, they are easily influenced by the state and conspiracies and are unable to counter them in most cases. On the other hand, O'-level textbooks directly refuse the state narrative. They develops analytical skills equipping students to counter propaganda, multiple narratives, and conspiracies. As an example, regarding the 1965 war, O'level books directly state that we not only signed a diplomatic peace declaration (Tashkent Declaration), but Ayub Khan had lied that Pakistan had, instead, won the war.

As a social experiment, I went around my neighborhood, asked all my family friends, schoolmates, and relatives, and basically, I came across any comment about the 1965 war. Interestingly, people over the age of thirty, and who had received a matriculation education, said, 'We taught India a lesson!'. Almost all students from my campus said, 'Although it was ceasefire if anybody won, it wasn't us'.

University education proves to make people more open and more anti-extremist, especially those students who take up humanities. As they study the actual and non-distorted versions of history accompanied by more qualified professors, it influences their views and they realize how the state has tried to manipulate them via their textbooks. These students explain the Pakistan ideology as put in the words of one such student (from the book): ‘Pakistan was not created for Islam but to secure the economic rights of Muslims. The real purpose was the welfare of the Muslim population. There was no focus on Shariat'.

On the other hand, students from more conservative universities and specifically science students who do not further study world history or history from an unbiased perspective are left with their distorted versions. It is these students who were the most vulnerable to conspiracy theories and the jihadist ideology. This explains the popularity of LeT (Lashkar e Taiba) at Pakistan’s premier government engineering universities (University of Engineering & Technology, Lahore) where its founder had previously professed.
Now, we see a paradigm shift. Militant groups (like the Balochistan Liberation Army) are not only targeting male institutions to brain wash their ideal followers, but women too, as can be seen by the 2022 attack on Chinese Citizens which was carried out by Shari Baloch.

*Shoutout to cousins, siblings or family friends who went to Engineering Schools as liberals and came with beards touching their midriffs, and shalwars tugged up.

The author suggests that ‘through greater exposure to world history, interactive classroom discussions, and a teaching style that asks questions as much as provides answers’, the country will be able to produce critically responsible citizens.

In the end, the book provides a complete overview of Madrassa education in Pakistan, the number of students enrolled, and how the textbooks portray violent jihad as a ‘responsibility of individual citizens’. Zia ul Haq granted the highest madressa degree equivalence to a master's degree though the idea was first introduced by Bhutto to win over the ulema.

The effects of a madrassa, though the small number of enrolment compared to matriculation and o levels, are sown in the Pakistani society by the teachers graduated from them who teach in schools and thus equip students with their own interpretations that are ‘fundamentalist at best, extremist at worse’. The author suggests that in order to go ahead with the madrassa reform, the state must realize the over-estimated impact of political Islamists and make their intentions to eradicate extremist madrassas only.

The author ends the book with an ‘Appraisal and A Way Forward’, in which regarding the February 2017 attacks, she claims that military operations against extremist groups only produce short-term results but reap even long-term consequences as the state fails to eradicate the mainstreamed Pakistan ideology and militants with even more ferocity rise and upside down the regional security.

One such consequence of Pakistan extremist blasphemy laws is the attack on Pakistani Qawalli singer Amjad Sabri, who reportedly made a blasphemous comment on the prophets family and was in turn killed in a target killing. TTP had claimed responsibility. It was then the military launched its countrywide operation against all militancies naming it ‘Raddul Fassad’.

While following February 2017 attacks on Sehwans, millions protested, ordinary citizens murmured about how such visits to shrines were unorthodox. These people ‘ventured into casual, dangerous takhfirism- accusations against other Muslims of apostasy deserving death’. These citizens justified acts of terror against their own people deciding whether they deserved it and pointing to extreme interpretations as justification.

Incidents such as disappearance or murders of influencers with a liberal, secular view of pakistan on the charge of blasphemy are evident of the state's perception of such persons as threat to the ‘Project of Pakistan’

Though The National Action Plan was added to the National internal security policy after the APS attack in 2014, in the author's view, it failed to acknowledge extremism as a consequence of the states ‘us vs them’ narrative, public education curriculum, the state's own extremist laws, or it’s encouraged jihadist approach during wars like Afghan Miracle, Kargil, and that of 1965.

The author differentiates Pakistan’s case from that of other countries in which there are one too many examples of xenophobia,(noting anti-Muslim violence in India) and biased histories (like Communist China). For the author, the difference is in the role the state and official institutions play. The Pakistani state points the finger at India, the way the army validates and supports the jihadist narrative, and the justification of violence in the name of Islam.

The author believes that one day Pakistanis will find their identity and shared nationalism not on the basis of religion but shared history and love for nation. In order to develop a positive narrative, the state must focus on ‘economic advancement and political development’. The weakening of the insecurity paradigm regarding India will also weaken the military's hold of the country- ‘which is precisely why it pushes back on it’. And though it has shown shyness in common governing matters, The Establishment still holds a firm grip on security policy. Any person who criticises, or questions behaviours of government, is considered unpatriotic or traitorous.

The author suggests that in order to shift the narrative, Pakistan must have an open conversation about extremism and treat it respective of the state's own Pakistan ideology.